Vinson vs Obama: Conclusion: Obama Is Lawless

It has been painfully clear that we have a "lawless" President. He not only does things that are illegal, he disregards the authority of the courts when he imposes his own tyrannical orders. If President Bush had done what he has done to the Oil Industry to your (pick you Left-wing favorite), Bush would have been thrown out of office. But as we know, the Constitution only means whatever the Left wants it to mean.

Many have argued that Vinson did not overturn Obama Care since Vinson did not write an injunction. The Media knowing its own spin is ludicrous simply keeps score. It is 2-2, therefore Obama Care stands. This is lawlessness.

Now Vinson did try to NOT strike down the entire law, but only the parts that had to do with forcing Americans to buy Medical insurance. This was simply impossible for a couple of reasons. As stated on page 63,

In considering this issue, I note that the defendants have acknowledged that the individual mandate and the Act’s health insurance reforms, including the guaranteed issue and community rating, will rise or fall together as these reforms “cannot be severed from the [individual mandate].”

In other words, the Obama lawyers admit that the individual mandate is so woven throughout this entire law, it simply cannot be struck down in parts. It must be struck down en Toto.

Unlike the portrayal of Vinson in the Media as some radical legislator from the bench, Vinson attempts to seek "severability" at some points but is not only unable to do so for the first reason, but for an even simpler reason. There are no severability clauses.

First, the Act does not contain a “severability clause,” which is commonly included in legislation to provide that if any part or provision is held invalid, then the rest of the statute will not be affected.

Without severability clauses Vinson must do his homework to see what he may do to save this law. As you can see, he is unable to do so in any sound way as is admitted by the Plaintiffs.

The question of severability ultimately turns on the nature of the statute at issue. For example, if Congress intended a given statute to be viewed as a bundle of separate legislative enactment or a series of short laws, which for purposes of convenience and efficiency were arranged together in a single legislative scheme, it is presumed that any provision declared unconstitutional can be struck and severed without affecting the remainder of the statute. If, however, the statute is viewed as a carefully-balanced and clockwork-like statutory arrangement comprised of pieces that all work toward one primary legislative goal, and if that goal would be undermined if a central part of the legislation is found to be unconstitutional, then severability is not appropriate. As will be seen, the facts of this case lean heavily toward a finding that the Act is properly viewed as the latter, and not the former. [pg 64-65]

Vinson argues that he must determine the intent of Congress to see if he is able to sever the individual mandate. He determines after much argumentation that he can not.

While this inquiry “can sometimes be ‘elusive’” [Free Enterprise Fund, supra, 130 S. Ct. at 3161], on the unique facts of this particular case, the record seems to strongly indicate that Congress would not have passed the Act in its present form if it had not included the individual mandate. This is because the individual mandate was indisputably essential to what Congress was ultimately seeking to accomplish. It was, in fact, the keystone or lynchpin of the entire health reform effort. [pg 66-67]

"Lynchpin" indeed! Vinson believes it is not the duty of the Judicial Branch to rewrite the law [unlike many on the Left].

Severing the individual mandate from the Act along with the other insurance reform provisions --- and in the process reconfiguring an exceedingly lengthy and comprehensive legislative scheme --- cannot be done consistent with the principles set out above. Going through the 2,700-page Act line-by-line, invalidating dozens (or hundreds) of some sections while retaining dozens (or hundreds) of others, would not only take considerable time and extensive briefing, but it would, in the end, be tantamount to rewriting a statute in an attempt to salvage it, which is foreclosed by Ayotte, supra. Courts should not even attempt to do that. It would be impossible to ascertain on a section-by-section basis if a particular statutory provision could stand (and was intended by Congress to stand) independently of the individual mandate. The interoperative effects of a partial deletion of legislative provisions are often unforseen and unpredictable. For me to try and “second guess” what Congress would want to keep is almost impossible. [72-73]

And again on page 74,

If Congress intends to implement health care reform --- and there would appear to be widespread agreement across the political spectrum that reform is needed --- it should do a comprehensive examination of the Act and make a legislative determination as to which of its hundreds of provisions and sections will work as intended without the individual mandate, and which will not. It is Congress that should consider and decide these quintessentially legislative questions, and not the courts.

Since Vinson has demonstrated that the Law is unConstitutional, and since the individual mandate is impossible to sever, the law is now null and void within the decision itself. He states on page 75,

Injunctive relief is an “extraordinary” [Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312, 102 S. Ct. 1798, 72 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1982)], and “drastic” remedy [Aaron v. S.E.C., 446 U.S. 680, 703, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 64 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1980) (Burger, J., concurring)]. It is even more so when the party to be enjoined is the federal government, for there is a long-standing presumption “that officials of the Executive Branch will adhere to the law as declared by the court. As a result, the declaratory judgment is the functional equivalent of an injunction.” See Comm. on Judiciary of U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 542 F.3d 909, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008); accord Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“declaratory judgment is, in a context such as this where federal officers are defendants, the practical equivalent of specific relief such as an injunction . . .since it must be presumed that federal officers will adhere to the law as declared by the court”) (Scalia, J.) (emphasis added).

To which Vinson concludes,

There is no reason to conclude that this presumption should not apply here. Thus, the award of declaratory relief is adequate and separate injunctive relief is not necessary.

Therefore, there is no need to have an injunction since the court declared it to be unConstitutional! The Media has been outright lying. Now to be certain, they are probably lying because they do not actually do research because from their viewpoint, the Constitution doesn't matter anyway.

Therefore, by definition, Obama is in violation of the Law in the grossest way. We have elected a President that defies the law of the land and the rule of law itself. Since Congress is not going to do something immediately to stop this renegade President, it is now up to the people of our precious Union to be certain that during the next elections, our voice is heard loud and clear.

As we used to say in Boston, "Throw the bums out!"